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Few advocates of the 
jury system would argue 
that the average juror is 
4 4 
\ 
This article has lacm c e d  with pmi*im 
frwn me oplghally published in i avv  and 
Gsatemm Pl~bhm, Volb 52, NU. 4, 
The fact that a jury must be composed 
of at least six people, with different I 
backgrounds, experiences, and perspec- 
tives, provides protection against 
decisions based on an idiosyncratic view 
of the facts. In addition, the jury must be 
chosen in a manner that reflects a 
representative cross-section of commu- 
nity opinion. The jury's competence, 
unlike that of the judge, rests partly on H E A D S  
its ability to reflect the perspectives, 
experiences, and values ~f the ordinary 
as competent a tribunal people in the community - not just the 
most common or tmical communitv 
I I 
as the average judge. I perspective, but the whole range of 
viewpoints. 
Whatever competence Representativeness is important not 
only for ensuring "the essential nature of 
the jury has is a the jury as a tribunal embodying a broad 
democratic idea1,"'but because it affects 
function of two of its the jury's competence directly. Failure to 
assure that any given group has a fair 
attributes: chance of participation "deprives the jury 
of a perspective on human events that 
mayhave unsuspected importance in if s number any case that may be presented."' 
A jury decision, however, is more 
and its than an average of the verdict prefer- 
ences of six or twelve citizens who interaction. represent a variety of experiences. 
ideally, the knowledge, perspectives,%nd I 
memories of the individual members are I 
compared and combined, and individual I 
errors and biases are discovered and 
discarded, so that the final verdict is 
forged from a shared understanding of 
the case. This understanding is more 
complete and more accurate than any of 
the separate versions that contributed to 
it, or indeed than their average. This 
transcendent understanding is the 
putative benefit of the deliberation 
process. 
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If it does nothing else, group delibera- 
tion (except in extraordimlily one-sided 
cases) forces people to realize that there 
are different ways of interpreting the 
same facts. W l e  this rarely provokes a 
prompt revisbn of the* own views, it 
necessirily remtmb the jury members 
that their perceptions are partly conjec- 
turd - an obvious truth, but one that is 
o t ~ ~ c  udikely to occur to them. 
A judge does not h e  this vivid 
reminder that alternative consttzlals are 
pogfible. A judge, however, has expen- 
- on the bench and training in the 
litw. Critics of the jury often focus on the 
inympetece of people chosen as jurors, 
chpared to that of the judge. At best, 
he. venire consists of a representatiye 
sample of the - community, with a few 
members Ghng genuine expertise, a 
large number who are simply average 
citizens, and a few others who are 
distinctly below average. In practice, 
many of the better-educated jurors are 
excused from senrice, and others who 
show knowledge or ability relevant to the 
particular case at trial may be challenged 
t h a n  
during the voir dire. A t t o w s  sometimes I 
select jurors for i n ~ o m p e t ~ : ~  Thus, 
some have argued that-the everage jury is 
not only less competent than the average 
judge, but is aiso less competent than a 
random sample of twelve citizem from 
the community. 
. Historicaly, the debate over the 
competence of juries has been less than 
enlightening. In particular, there are two 
conspicuous omissions. 
First, there is a great reluctance to 
define competent d e c i s i o n - h g .  Social A 
scientists who turn to the legal literature 
in search of criteria 6 which to evaluate 
the jury are likely to fmd it a fnvtmting 
experience. It is extremely difficult to,, 
design research that will contribute 
1 
useful information to the debate on 4 T 
competence when the concept of compe- 
tence is not defined. 
Second, most of the social science 
research and much of the legal debate has 
focused primarily on the jury's verdict, 
an extremely crude measure of compe- 
tence, and one that tells us very little 
a 
about what juries actually do. 
One way to look at jury functioning is 
to break down the jury's task into 
components, and look at the way the jury - 
deals with each one. ~enn in~ ton  and 
- 
Hastie4 have provided a useful list: 
1. Ellsworth & Getman, "Social Science in Legal 
Decision-Malung," in Low and tht SDcial Sciences 
1) The jury members must "encode" 596 (b Lipson Q S. Wheeler eds. 1986). 
the information they get at trial. A 2. Peten v. KiO: 407 U.S. 493,503-04 (1972) (plurality opinian of ~~, J., joined by 
competent jury must pay attention to the D O U ~ ~  and stewarc, u.) 
testimony and remember it. 3. see van ~jrke,]ur~ %ecrion Proccduns (1977); 
2) The jury muFt define the legal 
categories. A comdetent jury should 
defw these categohes as they are 
presented in the judges' instructions. 
3) The jury must select the admissible 
evidence and ignore evidence that is 
inadmissible. 
4) The jury must construct the 
sequence of events. 
5)  The jury must evaluate the credibil- 
ity of the witnesses. 
6) The jury must evaluate the evidence 
in relation to the legal categories 
provided in the instructions. That is, 
certain elements of the story the jury 
constructs are particularly important in 
determining the appropriate verdict. The 
jury must identify these elements and 
understand how differences in the 
interpretation of the facts translate into 
differences in the appropriate verdict 
choice. 
7) The jury must test its interpretation 
of the facts and the implied verdict 
choice against the standard of proof: 
preponderance of evidence, clear and 
convincing evidence, or beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
8) The jury must decide on the 
verdict. 
In discussing my research on jury 
deliberations, I present data and some 
impressions of how the jury performs 
these tasks; I also discuss some other 
aspects of jury deliberation. 
The research itself involved close 
analysis of eighteen mock juries in the 
first hour of deliberation. Because of the 
small sample size, statistical analysis of 
the data generally would be misguided. 
The study is most usefully considered as 
an intensive case study of the process of 
jury deliberation. However, the fact that 
here are eighteen cases rather than one 
makes it considerably more useful than 
the usual case study, because it allows for 
some assessment of the variability of 
juries exposed to the same stimulus. 
A major drawback is that none of the 
juries reached a verdict in the hour 
allotted to them. Thus, the study is most 
useful as an exploration of how juries 
structure their task, how well they deal 
with the facts and the law, and what 
things they discuss. it is very likely that 
at some point juries move into an 
"endgame" that may differ substantially 
from the phases preceding it. 
Method 
Ideally, the knowledge, 
perspectives, and 
memories of the 
individual members 
are compared and 
combined, and 
individual errors and 
biases are discovered 
and discarded, so that 
the final verdict is 
forged from a shared 
understanding of 
the case. 
Two hundred and sixteen adults 
eligible for jury service in Santa Clara or 
San Mateo County, California, partici- 
pated in the deliberation study and 
provided usable data. Thirty-three of 
them were recruited from the venire lists 
of the Santa Clara County Superior Court 
after completing their terms as jurors. 
The remainder had responded to a 
classified advertisement in local newspa- 
pers asking for volunteers for a study of 
"how jurors make decisions," or were 
referred by friends aware of or participat- 
ing in the study. Each subject was paid 
ten dollars for participation. 
The sample was fairly representative 
of the suburban upper-middle-clqss ,, 
community surrounding Stanford 
University, except that males and minori- 
ties were underrepresented. The sample 
was 93 percent white and 65.3 percent 
female. The average age of the subjects 
was 43, and 63 percent of the sample was 
employed outside the home. The median 
edicational level was slightly less than a 
college degree. Finally, 46 percent of the 
sample had previously performed jury 
duty, while 37 percent had actually 
served on juries. 
Subjects watched a videotape of a 
simulated homicide trial that represented 
all major aspects of an actual criminal 
trial. After hearing the evidence, argu- 
ments, and instructions, the jurors gave 
an initial verdict. Jurors were then 
assigned to twelve-person juries and 
allowed to deliberate for one hour. 
We chose to use a videotape prepared 
by Reid Hastie for use in his research on 
jury ~nanimity.~ This tape is representa- 
tive of the procedures, setting, style, and 
issues that commonly occur in actual 
homicide trials. The case was complex 
enough to afford several plausible 
interpretations and verdict preferences. 
It resembled most real murder trials in 
that there was no question that the 
defendant had killed the victim; rather, 
the evidence centered on the precise 
sequence of events preceding the killing 
and on the defendant's state of mind at 
the time. Finally, the tape was far more 
vivid and realistic than any other simu- 
1 lated trial materials we have encountered. 
11 was highly unlikely that we could have 1 constructed a better tape with our 
1 resources. 
/ Hastie's videotape is a reenactment of 
n actual homicide case based on a 
omplete transcript of the original trial, 
it11 a judge and experienced criminal 
torneys playing roles based on the 
dge's instructions and lawyers' 
nts. We modified the tape in two 
the present research. First, we 
hortened it slightly by deleting one 
efense witness whose testimony added 
ittle. Second, we replaced the segment of 
the original tape containing the original 
instructions, which had been based on 
Massachusetts law, with a new sequence 
in which the applicable California law 
was given. Pretesting indicated that the 
tape was regarded as convincing and 
realistic. 
In the trial videotape, the defendant, 
Frank Johnson, is charged with first- 
degree murder for the stabbing of Alan 
Caldwell outside a neighborhood bar. 
The prosecution brings evidence that the 
defendant and victim had argued in the 
bar earlier that day, and that Caldwell 
had threatened the defendant with a 
I straight razor. Johnson had left after the argument, but had returned with a friend that evening. Caldwell later came into the bar, and he and the defendant went 
outside and began to argue loudly. Two 
witnesses testify that they saw Johnson 
stab down into Caldwell's body. The 
victim's razor was subsequently found, 
folded, in his left rear pocket. 
1 For the defense, Johnson testifies that 
1 he had returned to the bar that evening I i on the invitation of his friend and had 
1 entered only after ascertaining that 
Caldweil was not there. Caldwell had 
come in later and had asked Johnson to 
step outside, presumably for the purpose 
! of patching up their quarrel. Once 
outside, Caldwell had hit him and come 1 a: him with a razor. Johnson had pulled 
out a fishing knife which he often carried 
1 in his pocket and Caldwell had run onto 
I the knife. In cross-examination, the 
I defense attorney cast doubt on the ability 
of the prosecution's eye witness to see the 
scuffle, and showed that medical evi- 
dence cannot establish whether the 
defendant stabbed down into the victim 
or whether the victim ran onto the knife. 
Four verdicts are possible in this case, 
depending upon the jury's findings of 
facts. The defendant may be guilty of 
first-degree murder, of second-degree 
murder, or of voluntary manslaughter, 
or he may be not guilty for reason of self- 
defense or accidental homicide. 
The study was conducted on weekend 
afternoons at Stanford University. Each 
subject group consisted of twelve to 
thirty-six subjects. Upon arrival, all 
subjects were given a brief overview of 
the study and asked to fill out an in- 
formed consent form and a preliminaiy 
questionnaire focusing on demographic 
characteristics, general attitudes toward 
the death penalty and toward criminal 
defendants, and general attitudes with 
respect to crime control and due process. 
The experimenter then introduced the 
videotape and instructed subjects to pay 
close attention because afterwards, they 
would be asked to deliberate to reach a 
verdict based on the facts of the case and 
the judge's instructions, just as if they 
were actual jurors. 
Deliberations 
As soon as the videotape was over, 
the experimenter asked the subjects to 
indicate their verdict preferences on an 
initial verdict questionnaire by checking 
one of four choices: first-degree murder, 
second-degree murder, manslaughter, or 
not guilty. After collecting the question- 
naires, the experimenter announced 
assignments to jury panels and directed 
each jury to a separate room for delibera- 
tion. These were seminar rooms 
equipped with a long table and a video 
camera and two ceiling microphones to 
record deliberations for later analysis. 
The equipment also allowed the experi- 
menters to view the deliberations on a 
monitor outside the room, in order to 
detect problems that might jeopardize 
the validity of the study. 
Once the subjects were settled in the 
jury room, the experimenter told them 
that their next task was to discuss the 
case and ti37 to reach a verdict. They were 
assured that their immediate 
postvideotape verdic: was confidential 
and that they need not feel committed to 
it. They were also told that most juries 
begin by taking a straw vote, and that in 
any case they should choose a foreman 
before beginning their deliberation. 
The experimenter continued as follows: 
As you discuss the case, it is 
important to put yourselves into the 
role of jurors. Imagine that you are a 
real jury and that your verdict will 
actually determine the fate of the 
defendant you saw on the tape. We 
want you to make your decision only 
on the basis of svha~ you saw- on the 
tape. Although the characters in the 
trial you saw were actors, we want you 
to treat them as if they were real. In 
short, we want you to make the 
decision you would make if you were a 
real jury and if you had seen in court 
exactly what you saw on the tape. 
The experimenter closed by informing 
the subjects that they had one hour in 
which to deliberate, and that they should 
try to reach a decision in that time, 
although quite posslbly one hour would 
not be long enough to reach a consensus. 
The purpose of this instruction was 
simply to assure that the subjects worked 
on their deliberation seriously and tried 
to reconcile their differences of opinion. 
V\7e did not ask them to take a vote at the 
end of the hour, and we did not expect 
them to reach a verdict. 
Subjects were then left to discuss the 
case. Although they appeared to be 
slightly self-conscious in the presence of 
the recording equipment for the first 
minute or two, the jurors became highly 
involved in tlie discussion and seemed to 
forget about the camera as soon as the 
deliberations revealed disagreements 
4 Pennington & Hast~e. ''Juror Decis~on hlak~ng 
Models: The General~zation Gap," 89 
Psyclzoiogicul Bulictin 246, 249-55 i1981) 
5 .  R. Haslie, S. Penrod. hs N. Pennlngton, 
Iizside the]u~y (1983). 
among the members, which occurred 
almost immediately for each jury. After 
an hour the experimenter returned, 
stopped the deliberation, and handed out 
the postexperiment questionnaires. 
The videotaped jury deliberations 
were transcribed, and the transcripts 
were divided into units. In devising the 
coding scheme, I identified thirty major 
issues in the case. A unit, by definition, 
could contain no more than one of these 
issues. Short utterances occasionally 
contained none; long utterances were 
divided into units corresponding to the 
number of issues. Each transcript was 
coded by one or more of three trained 
coders. Coders were gven lists of 100 
case facts, 18 major issues, and 60 legal 
instructions; at various points, two 
coders were asked to code the same jury 
in order to calculate inter-coder reliabil- 
ity. Each unit was coded for the general 
nature of the statement (issue, fact, law, 
vote, procedural comment, and so on), 
correctness, pro defense or pro prosecu- 
tion position, and the particular fact, 
issue, or point of law that was men- 
tioned. Coders met weekly with me to 
resolve questions and settle differences. 
Choosing a foreman 
All juries began by choosing a fore- 
man, not surprisingly, since the experi- 
menter had instructed them to do so. 
The foreman was always chosen very 
quickly, with a minimum of discussion. 
The process of foreman selection can 
be summed up by the phrase "choose a 
man who says he has experience." 
6. This gender bias in choice of a foreperson has 
changed little over the last forty years. See 
Strodtbeck, James, & Hawhns, "Social Status in 
Jury Deliberations," 22 Amer. Soc. Rev. 713 
(1957). It occurs not only in mock jury research 
but in real trials. See Ken,  Hamon & Graves, 
"Independence of Multiple Verdicts by Jurors 
and Juries,' 12 J. Applied Soc. psycho lo^ 12, 
24-25 (1982); Note, "Gender Dynamics and Jury 
Deliberations," 96Yale LawJournal 593 (1987). 
7. See Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, supra note 5 ;  
see also Hawhns, "In~eraction Rates of Jurors 
Aligned in Factions," 27 Am. Soc. Rev. 689 
(1962). 
8. See H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Juiy 
486 (1966). 
Although 65 percent of the jurors were 
female, sixteen of the eighteen foremen 
were male.6 On the jury composed of 
eleven women and one man, the man 
was chosen. When the jurors had arrived 
in the room and settled in their seats, 
someone would point out that their first 
job was to chose a foreman, and then 
typically someone would ask, "Has 
anybody had any experience with this 
sort of thing?" A man would claim 
experience, and the other jurors would 
agree that he should take the job. 
Occasionally two men would claim 
experience and a brief "after you, 
Alphonse" discussion would ensue until 
one of them said, "all right, I'll do it." 
These two scenarios account for foreman 
selection in ten of the eighteen juries. 
Since we knew which of our subjects 
had actually served on real juries, we 
were able to find out whether the people 
chosen as foreman were actually more 
likely to have had prior jury experience 
than the other jurors. They were not 
more experienced: 39 percent of the 
foremen had served on juries, as com- 
pared with 36 percent of the other jurors, 
an insignificant difference. Thus, a 
foreman is someone who claims experi- 
ence, not necessarily someone who has it. 
On the remaining eight juries, five 
foremen (four male, one female) were 
chosen because they were sitting in one 
of the seats on the ends of the table, and 
three (two male, one female) were 
individuals who had opened the discus- 
sion by volunteering for the position. 
Altogether, nine of the foremen were 
sitting at the head of the table, and four 
others were sitting in the chair right next 
to the head. Table position is by no 
means a subtle proxemic cue that exerts 
an unconscious influence on the jurors; 
in the majority of cases the jurors 
explicitly gave table position as their 
reason for their choice - "you should do 
it, you're sitting in the right place." 
These data suggest that jurors give 
little consideration to their selection of 
foremen. They are generally given no 
information on what qualifications to 
look for, so they have little to guide them 
but their background knowledge and 
stereotypes of the jury, gained from the 
media and other sources. In the movies, 
the foreman sits at the head of the table. 
In addition, at the time that the 
foreman is chosen, most jurors may still 
regard their task as a relatively simple 
one, because the extent of disagreement 
on the jury has not yet been revealed. 
They may not think it makes much 
difference who is chosen foreman, 
because they see the case as straightfor- 
ward and do not anticipate serious 
disputes. Finally, since no disagreements 
have yet been revealed, it is likely that 
strong norms of courtesy prevail at the 
time that the foreman is selected. Once 
someone has been suggested, the others 
may think it is impolite to question his or 
her ability. 
Taking the task seriously 
Once the foreman was selected, the 
juries took one of two approaches to 
their task. One-half of the juries began by 
taking a vote, roughly evenly divided 
among show-of-hands, secret ballot, and 
a go-around procedure in which each 
juror states a position and says a little 
about his or her reasons for taking that 
position. The other half of the juries 
began by discussing the facts and issues 
in the case. The judge's instructions 
contained a caution to the jurors not to 
become unduly committed to their 
position but to remain open-minded. 
A few jurors interpreted these instruc- 
tions to mean that they should not begin 
deliberations with a vote. 
Hastie and his colleagues7 have 
proposed that when a jury postpones a 
formal vote, it is freer to raise issues and 
discuss them open-mindedly. When a 
jury begins by voting, people feel com- 
mitted to the position they have publicly 
expressed, and spend their time defend- 
ing their position rather than trylng to 
understand the facts and the law. Our 
data generally support Hastie's findings. 
Juries that postponed voting spent more 
time talking about the important issues in 
the case, and brought out more facts. 
One might hypothesize that juries that 
voted early would spend more time 
discussing the relevant law, because they 
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would nced to define thc legal verdict 
categories befmc they could vote. This, 
h~wmr ,  wm nat the w e .  Early versus 
late v o a  did not predict thc amount of 
tifie spat dbcusiing the hw. 
Wh&er or not a jury begn by 
voting, it ans qic]Itly appprmt to 
members of the jury that they disagreed 
about the,appropriau: verdict. 1Zs soon as 
these disagreements emerged, the 
chakter of the deliberation changed. 
During foreman selection there was an 
atmosphere of convivality in the jury 
room, along with some degree of self- 
consciowness. A few jurors joked about 
the videotape camera. Once the discus- 
sion or an early vote revealed differences 
of opinion, there were no more refer- 
ences to the camera and few jokes of any 
sort. They kept their attention focused on 
the w e .  
On the average, 47 percent of their 
utterances concerned the facts of the 
case; 32 percent addressed the important 
contested issues (for example, the 
defendant's state of mind, provocation, 
angle of the knife thrust, ability of 
witnesses to see the crime); 2 1 percent 
dealt with the law and the judge's 
instructions; and 7 percent were-votes or 
discussions about calling for a vote. 
(A given utterance could involve both a 
fact and an issue, or a fact and a point of 
law, so the percentages do not add to 
100 percent.) These proportions are quite 
comparable to those found by Hastie and 
colleagues,-whose juries saw the same 
case but deliberated to a final verdict. 
The criticism that juries approach their 
task in a frivolous manner receives no 
support from this study or from any 
other serious empirical research on 
the jury. 
Discussing facts and issues 
Whether or not the jury began with a 
vote, the general progression of the 
deliberation moved from an emphasis on 
facts toward an emphasis on law. In 
juries that did not begin by voting, the 
initial discussion resembled a random 
walk through the facts and issues. A topic 
would be raised, discussed briefly, and 
replaced by a totally different topic, with 
little attempt to organize the discussion 
and no attempt to resolve the issues. 
a 
When a jury 
begns by voting, 
people feel 
committed to the 
position they have 
publicly expressed, 
and spend their 
time defending 
their position rather 
than trying to 
understand the facts 
and the law. 
mese juri& confanned very closely to 
%lve&nnd Zeisel's observation that "the 
talk moves in small bursts of coherence, 
shifting from topic to topic with mnark- 
able flexibility. It touches an issue, leaves 
it, and returns again." During the hour 
of deliberation, the important facts and 
issues would come up again and again, 
while trivial issues would be dropped, 
and new issues added. Typically, as an 
issue was examined aPrd re-examined, 
there would be movement toward 
consensus.For example, one of the most 
important pieces of evidence in the trial 
was the coroner's statement that he found 
the victim's razor folded up in his back 
left pocket. Had the victim been coming 
at the defendant with the razor, a self- 
defense scenario would have been very 
plausible. The defendant and his fiend 
claimed to have seen the razor drawn; 
two other witnesses testified that they &d 
not see the razor. Most jpries raised this 
issue early and dropped it without fully 
considering the implications. 
In subsequent discussions, someone 
would raise the possibility that the victim 
somehow, in a reflex-like action, could 
have folded up the razor and pocketed it 
after he was stabbed, or that someone 
else (the policeman, the ambulance 
doctor, or a passer-by) might have picked 
it up and put it in the dead man's pocket. 
The jury would eventually conclude that 
these possibilities were farfetched, and 
agree that the victim never pulled the 
razor during the fatal confrontation. As a 
consequence, some juries would reject 
the possibility of self-defense and a few 
would turn their attention to the relevant 
question of the defendant's possible belief 
that the razor was drawn. In general, over 
the course of deliberation, jurors appear 
to focus more on the important facts and 
issues, come to a clearer understanding 
of them, and approach consensus on the 
facts. 
In juries that began with a vote, the 
discussion tended to be slightly more 
organized. The average distribution of 
verdicts prior to deliberation was one for 
first-degree murder, two for second- 
degree murder, six for manslaughter, and 
two for not guilty. Although none of the 
juries showed exactly this pattern, most 
of them had a majority of votes in the 
two mlddle categones w t h  outllers [or 
not guilty or for both not guilty and first- 
degree murder A common tactic was for 
the middle jurors to begn by asking the 
outllers to explaln their demant posltlon, 
typically startmg w t h  the proponents of 
first-degree murder Whether or not the 
jury began m t h  a vote, however, issues 
were ralsed and dropped falrly 
unsystematically, then ralsed agam, 
slowly, progress was made Llttle by 
little, most junes resolved the lssues of 
fact and spent a11 lncreaslng proportion 
of their clme on the central Issue the 
defendant's state of mind 
Dealing with the facts 
Kalven and Zeisel conclude that "the 
jury does by and large understand the 
facts and get the case straight." On the 
mrhole, the data from this study support 
that conclusion. The juries in our study 
spent more time discussing the facts of 
the case (47 percent of the units included 
references to facts brought out in testi- 
mony) than anythng else. These were 
rarely purely factual statements. Most of 
the time facts were raised in connection 
with a contested issue, a reference to 
common sense or knowledge, a hypo- 
thetical scenario, or a reference to the 
law. 
Most of the juries managed to sort out 
the factual issues fairly well during the 
process of deliberation. Conflicting 
testimony (for example, about the angle 
of the knife thrust) was recognized as 
such, so that juries ended up correctly 
attributing different versions of the story 
to different witnesses. Questions regard- 
ing the distance and angle of vision of the 
various witnesses were generally resolved 
correctly, and errors of fact generally 
were corrected. None of the juries 
maintained an erroneous perception of 
an important fact after the hour of 
deliberation. Implausible suggestions 
generally were discussed and rejected, as 
- --- 
9. Id. at  149. 
111 the case of someone putting the razor 
m the mctlm's pocket after he was 
stabbed 
Jurors tended to focus on testlmony 
that favored thelr initial verdlct prefer- 
ences Testimony about the prevlous 
confrontation between the two men was 
generally ralsed by jurors who favored a 
murder verdlct, whereas testlmony that 
the mctlm punched the defendant 
~mmedlately before the killlng was 
generally raised by jurors who favored 
manslaughter or self-defense Thls 
tendency is not a weakness, but rather a 
beneflt of the dellberatlon process - 
the opportunity it affords for companng 
several different interpretations of the 
events along w t h  the supporting factual 
emdence 
For most of the junes m this study, 
discussion of the facts and issues doml- 
nated the first part of the hour Among 
the junes that voted early, there was 
usually some dlscusslon of the judge's 
instructions m order to amve at the 
verdict categones, but the dlscusslon was 
generally quite superficial Dunng the 
course of the factual dlscusslons, the 
central lssues of disagreement emerged, 
and jurors attempted to persuade each 
other Agreement on the facts, however, 
dld not lead to substantial agreement on 
the central Issue of the case the 
defendant's state of mlnd Jurors tned to 
persuade each other that thelr construals 
of the facts made sense The dlscusslons 
often became heated, few opinions were 
changed, and at some point (often, but 
not necessanly in connection w t h  a 
vote), the jurors would turn to the legal 
definitions of the verdlct choices for 
guldance 
Dealing with the law 
Juries worked hard to understand the 
law. They spent an average of 21 percent 
of their time discussing the judge's 
instructions. Following the hour of 
deliberation, jurors were p e n  an 
eighteen-question true-false test on 
elements of the judge's instn~ctions. On 
average, the jurors answered 11.7 of the 
questions correctly, a result not signifi- 
cantly different from random guessing. 
On a postdeliberation multiple-choice 
test of factual Issues, however, jurors 
performed qulte well, answering correctly 
an average of 8 8 out of 14 questions 
(since there were four response altema- 
tlves, 3 5 correct answers would be 
expected by chance) These results 
suggest that the dellberatlon process 
works well m correcting errors of fact but 
not m correcting errors of law 
An examlnatlon of the statements 
jurors made about the law dunng the 
course of their deliberat~ons promdes 
further gloomy detail We coded all 
statements jurors made about the law as 
correct, mcorrect, or unclear Remarks 
were coded as correct even if they were 
incomplete For example, the statement 
"flrst-degree murder lnvolves premedlta- 
tlon" would be scored as correct State- 
ments were scored as incorrect ~f they 
were unambiguously wrong, for example, 
"second-degree murder lnvolves pre- 
medltatlon " 
Statements that were coded as unclear 
were usually statements about verdlct- 
evldence relationships, for example, 
"If Johnson knew that Caldwell would be 
there, x's premedltatlon " Whlle thls 
statement 1s technically false, because 
returning to a bar knowng that one's 
enemy IS there does not necessanly Imply 
Intent to klll, ~t was scored as unclear, 
because the juror could have meant that 
Johnson's knowledge was a relevant 
conslderatlon m determining premedita- 
tion Thus, we did not code statements as 
incorrect unless there was no plausibly 
correct construal 
Given thls rather lenlent coding, we 
found that only half of the references to 
the law (631) were accurate, even when 
credit was given for partial accuracy 
We found that 609 were not correct 
(28 percent unclear, 21 percent definl~ely 
mcorrect) Whereas factual errors tended 
to be corrected dunng deliberation, 
errors of law were not corrected Consid- 
enng instances where the jury changed 
~ t s  posltlon, 52 percent of them Involved 
replacing an erroneous response w t h  a 
correct one, and 48 percent involved 
replac~ng a correct response m t h  an 
erroneous one 
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correct in their definitions (sixty-five 
correct statements, five incorrect, thirty- 
I 
categories) conveyed an incorrect, twenty unclear, four questions, 
of considerable uncertainty and tvm error corrections). 
'Was a . . . I think it was something These results suggest that much of the 
out passion?"), and jurors who seemed jurors' discussion of the law on first- The fact that 
, 8 
nfident about the law were often degree murder may have been based on - 
lieved, whether or not their statements the well-known phrase "premeditation "involuntary 
orresponded to the judge's instructions. and deliberation," and did not benefit 
Of the 1,752 units across all juries that from the new infomation provided by . 
eferred to the law, only seventy-five the judge's instructions. In addition, one 
rcent) were error corrections. discussed almost as 
much as "heat of 
percent of the 1,285 referenqs to the since fewer jurors favored first-degree 
dict choices addressed the distinctions murder than any other verdict choice. passion" 
tweenathem. Of these, 26 percent were Likewise, the fami-4iar phrase *heat of a 
rrect statements, 11 percent were passionn was the most commonly in relation to the 
finitely incorrect, 42 percent were discussed element of manslaughter and 
clear, and 21 percent were questions. accounted for 125 units, of which a third manslaughter 
amining each jury's last definition of were incorrect or unclear statements. 
e four verdict choices during the course Interestingly, "involuntary manslaughter" verdict provides 
the hour, we found that no jury was was raised in ninety-three units, of which 
rrect on all four of them. ~t appears fifty-one were clearly incorrect. ~t is not further evidence that 
most jurors failed to absorb a great surprising that most of the references 
y of the judge's instructions and that were incorrect, since the judge had stated 
that the verdict category "involuntary 
manslaughter" was not relevant to this . . j 
case. The fact that "involuntary man- 
earned less than they should have from slaughtern was discussed almost as much knowledge gained 
e judge's instructions comes from as "heat of passion" in relation to the 
minating the frequenq with which manslaughter verdict provides further outside the 
do on the judge's 
Although most of the law discussed by 
leard the case; thus, there is a strong the jurors involved the substance of the instructions. 
)ossibility that much of their discussion verdict categories, jurors devoted 7 
percent of their discussion of the law to 
the reasonable doybt standard, and 10 
percent to the judge's instructions about 
the jurors' duties. The juries' understand- 
ing of reasonable doubt and how they 
must rule in the face of reasonable doubt 
was extremely accurate. Not one person 
on any jury, however, raised the question 
of the definition of reasonable doubt. 
Like "premeditated murder," the 
phrase "beyond a reasonable doubt" is one 
that is likely to be familiar to jurors from 
prior experience, so we cannot conclude 
that they learned t h s  standard from the 
judge's instructions. Attempts to apply the 
reasonable doubt standard to the facts of 
the case were evenly divided between 
correct and incorrectlunclear applications. 
The reasonable doubt standard was almost 
always raised by jurors who were trying to 
persuade a harsher faction to move toward 
their position. 
Procedural instructions were also used 
as arguing tactics. Of the 172 remarks 
made about jurors' duties, 1 14 were 
devoted to three of the eleven 
instructions given by the judge: that 
jurors should only be influenced by the 
evidence and law presented in court 
(forty-nine remarks); that jurors should 
not speculate about sustained objections 
(twenty-two); and that jurors should not 
consider the penalty or consequences of 
the verdict (forty-three). 
These comments were also used 
primarily as a weapon to close off lines of 
argument that a juror disagreed with, and 
generally took the form, "We can't 
speculate about that," or "We're not 
allowed to consider that." Jurors applied 
these rules incorrectly thirty-nine times 
and were clearly incorrect forty-five 
times; only fifteen of these forty-five 
errors were corrected. A great deal of 
concern has been expressed about jurors' 
inability to disregard extra-evidentiary 
factors; our data suggest that this concern 
is appropriate. However, jurors may also 
use the judge's cautionary instructions to 
stifle discussion of unpalatable, but 
clearly relevant, evidence. 
Conclusion 
In summary, the process of 
deliberation seems to work quite well in 
bringng out the facts and arriving at a 
consensus about their sequence. Errors 
are corrected, and irrelevant facts and 
implausible scenarios are generally 
weeded out, at least in deliberations over 
this relatively simple homicide. The 
juries also do a good job of gradually 
narrowing down discussion to the 
important issues. On the whole, 
however, the discussion of the facts does 
not produce changes in votes, since 
jurors' verdict preferences in the case 
were rarely a function of a clear mistake 
on the facts. 
Unfortunately, the jurors' understand- 
ing of the law was substantially inferior 
to their understanding of the facts and 
issues.The judge's instructions were not 
very effective in educating them in new 
areas, or even in focusing their attention 
on the meaning of the familiar terms. 
This failure to apply the law correctly was 
by no means a failure to take the law 
seriously. Discussions of the law took up 
one-fifth of the deliberation time and 
were carried out with great intensity, 
frequently with an apparent sense of 
frustration. The jurors understood that a 
key aspect of their task was to interpret 
the evidence in terms of the appropriate 
legal categories. They struggled to do so, 
but often failed. 
There is no reason to believe that the 
jurors' misunderstanding of the law is a 
function of their mental capacities. It seems 
more plausible that the system is set up to 
promote misunderstanding. Factors 
blockading the serious jury trylng to 
perform its task include: the convoluted, 
technical language; the dry and abstract 
presentation of the law following the vivid, 
concrete, and often lengthy presentation of 
evidence; the requirement that jurors 
interpret the evidence before they know 
what their verdict choices are; the fact that 
juries usually do not get copies of the 
instructions to take with them into the jury 
room; the lack of training in the law for 
jurors as part of their jury duty; the general 
failure to discover and correct jurors' 
preconceptions about the law; the failure 1 
to inform jurors that they are allowed to I 
ask for help with the instructions; and the 
fact that those who do ask for help are 
often disappointed by a simple repetition 
1 
i 
of the incomprehensible paragraph. 1 
Research on jurors' comprehension of 
judge's instructions is increasing, but there 
is still very little. We do not even know 
whether juries that ask for help with the 
instructions do better than juries that try t i  
muddle through on their own. Research or 
specific techniques for improving juror 
comprehension indicates that improve- 
ment is possible. At any rate, it seems 
profoundly unfair to criticize juries for 
failing to perform well a task that, by all 
the usual educational criteria, has been 
stacked against them. 
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